

VZCZCXRO9464

OO RUEHB1 RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHEK #0824 2261133

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 131133Z AUG 08

FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1278

INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2986

RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0637

RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2615

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0995

RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3008

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2393

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE

RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP

RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BISHKEK 000824

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KG](#)

SUBJECT: TFGG01: KYRGYZ DEPUTY FM ON GEORGIA CRISIS, CIS
ROLE

Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) On August 13, Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister Ibraimov provided his ministry's views on the conflict in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan's effort, as CIS chair, to mediate. Ibraimov explained that the CIS operates primarily in the cultural and humanitarian sphere, and has very little authority to act on security issues. In the early 1990's a CIS Defense Ministers council was created, but it is ineffective. As holder of the rotating CIS chair, however, Kyrgyzstan does have the authority to call extraordinary consultations, which is the mechanism Kyrgyzstan activated to help resolve the conflict in Georgia. The CIS maintains a headquarters in Minsk, where CIS Ambassadors to Belarus are dual-hatted to the CIS headquarters. Kyrgyzstan first attempted to hold consultations among Ambassadors in Minsk, but found that they were ill-prepared. Kyrgyzstan next consulted with those CIS Ambassadors resident in Bishkek (Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus), and via Kyrgyz embassies abroad with as many of the remainder as possible. Unfortunately, Ibraimov said they were unable to consult directly with any representatives of Georgia before the announcement that Russia was ceasing military operations.

¶2. (C) Nonetheless, as a result of the consultations that were held on August 11 and 12, Ibraimov said a consensus emerged around three points. These concerned the need for both sides to agree on a cease-fire, both sides to agree to a binding agreement on non-use of force, and both sides to withdraw forces (only peacekeeping forces covered under previous agreements could be present in South Ossetia). Some CIS countries, including Kazakhstan, also suggested organizing a CIS-hosted conference or ministerial with all CIS Foreign Ministers. Kyrgyzstan had been prepared to offer to sponsor negotiations under CIS auspices under any formula acceptable to the parties -- i.e., in a 2 plus 1 format or among all 12 CIS members. With the announcement that French President Sarkozy and President Medvedev had negotiated an end to hostilities, however, Ibraimov said no further CIS mediation efforts were needed. He did not expect any CIS statements on the conflict, and thought chances were low that

the issue would be on the agenda for the October CIS summit in Bishkek.

¶3. (C) Charge explained U.S. concerns about the disproportionate use of force by the Russians, and the violation of Georgia's territorial integrity. Ibraimov said "no one knows what happened" to start the conflict, but noted that Russian President Medvedev had instructed the Russian Prosecutor General to seek evidence of Georgian "genocide" against South Ossetians. Ibraimov said this means the Prosecutor General would "find" such evidence, which the Russians would use to justify the level of force they had used. Ibraimov said he had no doubts that the U.S. was not informed by the Georgians in advance of their deployment of forces into South Ossetia, noting that he had met President Saakashvili a few times, and knew that he was an impulsive person.

LITZENBERGER